Tax Avoidance and the Real Effect of Tax-Risk Disclosures
I quantify the financial reporting effect of tax-risk disclosures (“FIN 48”) on tax avoidance. To isolate this effect from other factors that influence tax avoidance, I use a dynamic structural model in which a firm chooses a set of tax-saving projects in each
period to maximize shareholder value. In this model, the firm trades off the tax savings with the financial-reporting costs, operational frictions imposed by tax avoidance, and tax-authority scrutiny. I estimate the FIN 48 disclosure increases effective
tax rates by 2.8 percentage points relative to when firms can immediately recognize all of the benefit. When I adjust the disclosure to reflect the expected repayment from a tax inspection, I find effective tax rates increase by 0.8 percentage points. I also find
that average operational frictions from tax avoidance decrease pre-tax earnings by 7.4%, which can explain the “undersheltering puzzle”.
I quantify the financial reporting effect of tax-risk disclosures (“FIN 48”) on tax avoidance. To isolate this effect from other factors that influence tax avoidance, I use a dynamic structural model in which a firm chooses a set of tax-saving projects in each
period to maximize shareholder value. In this model, the firm trades off the tax savings with the financial-reporting costs, operational frictions imposed by tax avoidance, and tax-authority scrutiny. I estimate the FIN 48 disclosure increases effective
tax rates by 2.8 percentage points relative to when firms can immediately recognize all of the benefit. When I adjust the disclosure to reflect the expected repayment from a tax inspection, I find effective tax rates increase by 0.8 percentage points. I also find
that average operational frictions from tax avoidance decrease pre-tax earnings by 7.4%, which can explain the “undersheltering puzzle”.
Long-Term Economic Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions
with Ed deHaan and David Larcker
We examine the long-term effects of interventions by activist hedge funds. Research documents positive equal-weighted long-term returns and operating performance improvements following activist interventions, and typically conclude that activism is beneficial. We extend the literature in two ways. First, we find that equal-weighted long-term returns are driven by the smallest 20% of firms, with an average market value of $22 million. The larger 80% of firms experience insignificant negative long-term returns. On a value-weighted basis, which likely best gauges the effects on shareholder wealth and the economy, we find that pre- to post-activism long-term returns insignificantly differ from zero. For operating performance, we find that prior results are a manifestation of abnormal trends in pre-activism performance. Using an appropriately matched sample, we find no evidence of abnormal post-activism performance improvements. Overall, our results do not strongly support the hypothesis that activist interventions drive long-term benefits for the typical shareholder, nor do we find evidence of shareholder harm.
with Ed deHaan and David Larcker
We examine the long-term effects of interventions by activist hedge funds. Research documents positive equal-weighted long-term returns and operating performance improvements following activist interventions, and typically conclude that activism is beneficial. We extend the literature in two ways. First, we find that equal-weighted long-term returns are driven by the smallest 20% of firms, with an average market value of $22 million. The larger 80% of firms experience insignificant negative long-term returns. On a value-weighted basis, which likely best gauges the effects on shareholder wealth and the economy, we find that pre- to post-activism long-term returns insignificantly differ from zero. For operating performance, we find that prior results are a manifestation of abnormal trends in pre-activism performance. Using an appropriately matched sample, we find no evidence of abnormal post-activism performance improvements. Overall, our results do not strongly support the hypothesis that activist interventions drive long-term benefits for the typical shareholder, nor do we find evidence of shareholder harm.
Peer Group Choice and Chief Executive Officer Compensation
with David Larcker and Christina Zhu
We examine the selection of peer groups that boards of directors use when setting the level of CEO compensation. This choice is controversial because it is difficult to ascertain whether peer groups are selected to (i) attract and retain top executive talent or (ii) enable rent extraction by inappropriately increasing CEO compensation. In contrast to prior research, our analysis utilizes the degree to which the observed compensation level of peers in the portfolio is unusual relative to all potential portfolios of peers the board of directors could have reasonably selected. Using a sample of 10,235 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2014, we estimate roughly 33% of board of directors’ choices appear to be associated with rent extraction, whereas the remaining 67% are associated with attracting and retaining high-quality CEO talent. Relative to firms that appear to select peers for aspirational labor market reasons, we find rent extraction firms have more structural governance concerns and realized negative governance outcomes. Over our sample period, we estimate the aggregate excess pay for rent extraction firms is approximately $5.4 billion, or 38% of their total pay.
with David Larcker and Christina Zhu
We examine the selection of peer groups that boards of directors use when setting the level of CEO compensation. This choice is controversial because it is difficult to ascertain whether peer groups are selected to (i) attract and retain top executive talent or (ii) enable rent extraction by inappropriately increasing CEO compensation. In contrast to prior research, our analysis utilizes the degree to which the observed compensation level of peers in the portfolio is unusual relative to all potential portfolios of peers the board of directors could have reasonably selected. Using a sample of 10,235 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2014, we estimate roughly 33% of board of directors’ choices appear to be associated with rent extraction, whereas the remaining 67% are associated with attracting and retaining high-quality CEO talent. Relative to firms that appear to select peers for aspirational labor market reasons, we find rent extraction firms have more structural governance concerns and realized negative governance outcomes. Over our sample period, we estimate the aggregate excess pay for rent extraction firms is approximately $5.4 billion, or 38% of their total pay.
Evolution in Value Relevance of Accounting Information
with Mary E. Barth and Ken Li
We address how value relevance of accounting information evolved as the new economy developed. Prior research concludes accounting information—primarily earnings—has lost relevance. We consider more accounting amounts and find no decline in combined value relevance from 1962 to 2014. We assess evolution in each amount’s value relevance and find increases, most notably for amounts related to intangible assets, growth opportunities, and alternative performance measures, which are important in the new economy. The number of relevant amounts also increases. We also consider separately new economy, non-new economy profit, and non-new economy loss firms. Although the relevance trends are most pronounced for new economy firms, they are economy-wide. We base inferences on a non-parametric approach that automatically incorporates nonlinearities and interactions, thereby unconstraining the valuation relation. Taken together, our findings reveal a more nuanced, but not declining, relation between share price and accounting information that reflects the new economy.
with Mary E. Barth and Ken Li
We address how value relevance of accounting information evolved as the new economy developed. Prior research concludes accounting information—primarily earnings—has lost relevance. We consider more accounting amounts and find no decline in combined value relevance from 1962 to 2014. We assess evolution in each amount’s value relevance and find increases, most notably for amounts related to intangible assets, growth opportunities, and alternative performance measures, which are important in the new economy. The number of relevant amounts also increases. We also consider separately new economy, non-new economy profit, and non-new economy loss firms. Although the relevance trends are most pronounced for new economy firms, they are economy-wide. We base inferences on a non-parametric approach that automatically incorporates nonlinearities and interactions, thereby unconstraining the valuation relation. Taken together, our findings reveal a more nuanced, but not declining, relation between share price and accounting information that reflects the new economy.
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Copyright 2017-2019 Charles McClure. All rights reserved.
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